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Abstract 
Sustained high growth in many developing countries (‘the rise of the rest’) combined with long-standing 
WTO working practices hampers the ability of the WTO to perform its routine functions and paralyzes 
efforts to adapt to new circumstances. Preferential trade agreements have taken up some of the slack in 
addressing differences in domestic regulation of product safety, environmental and social conditions, 
but are exclusionary and inefficient from a global perspective. In this paper, we argue that a new type 
of agreement based on open plurilateral cooperation offers better prospects for groups of countries to 
explore and develop their potential common interests on regulatory matters, while safeguarding core 
aspects of their national regulatory sovereignty and in-creasing the possibility of regenerating the WTO 
from within. 
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1. Introduction* 
Rapid growth in developing economies (‘the rise of the rest’) combined with long-standing working 
practices hampers the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to perform its routine functions 
and paralyzes efforts to adapt to new circumstances, above all the decreasing importance of tariffs and 
the increasing importance of regulatory differences as impediments to trade. Differences in domestic 
regulation of product safety, environmental and social conditions are often being addressed in 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), typically among regional trading partners (e.g., the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership) or between a trading area and 
a key partner (e.g., the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU).1 
Such agreements exclude WTO members not party to them and thus are as much or more a device for 
opting out of the current system as for augmenting it. Because they are broad trade deals—more limited 
variants of the regime embodied by the WTO—PTAs are as likely to be challenged politically as 
instruments of an excessive and unwanted globalization as the WTO itself. Despite, indeed often because 
of their innovative ambitions, PTAs do little to extend the reach of multilateral rulemaking to urgent 
new topics while rendering the institutional foundations of global trade more fragile. 
In parallel to the expansion in use of PTAs, extensive regulatory coordination occurs outside the 
WTO.2 In the case of trade in some environmentally sensitive goods, such as forest products and palm 
oil, concerns that commerce in these goods does not further threaten endangered species, contribute to 
deforestation or undermine the rights of native communities have led to the emergence of a substantial 
thatching of national laws barring, for example, import of wood harvested in violation of various legal 
requirements and a profusion of NGO-sponsored international standards for sustainable forestry. 
Because they are not discriminatory, the resulting regimes do not, like PTAs, undermine the WTO. The 
burden of coordinating consistent implementation and enforcement of many similar yet subtly different 
norms and procedures are great; and the strains of bearing that burden, together with many other signs 
of fragility, reinforce, if only indirectly, the sense we can no more count on the spontaneous self-
organization of states and NGOs facing common threats to protect core values in global commerce than 
we can rely on the comprehensive, top-down response of PTAs. 
This essay extrapolates from successful cases of far-ranging or deep international regulatory 
cooperation in domains such as food safety, civil aviation and pharmaceuticals to propose a novel 
vehicle—formally organized as multilateral agreements to avoid the pitfalls of PTAs and patchwork 
regimes—for groups of countries to develop potential common interests in regulatory matters within the 
WTO, while safeguarding key aspects of their national regulatory sovereignty. We call this vehicle the 
open plurilateral agreement (OPA) and argue that it is valuable in and of itself; that the WTO has 
multiple roles—ranging from the provision of capacity-building services to dispute resolution—to play 
in establishing such an institutional facility; and that doing so can support the regeneration of the WTO 
from within.3 The proposal is at once a concrete project for reform and a heuristic for understanding the 
                                                     
* We are grateful to Robert Basedow, Thomas Bollyky, Marco Bronckers, Paola Conconi, Philipp Genschel, Sean Heather, 
David Levi-Faur, Nuno Limão, Patrick Low, Aaditya Mattoo, Petros Mavroidis, Peter Mumford, Julie Nind, Dani 
Rodrik, Richard Stewart, Robert Wolfe, Jonathan Zeitlin, two referees and participants in the WTO Trade Dialogue: 
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1 See e.g., Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014) and Hofmann, Osnago and Ruta (2018). Palanco and Sauvé (2018) describe and 
discuss the coverage of regulatory cooperation chapters in recent trade agreements. 
2 Overdevest and Zeitlin (2018a, b) and Pacheco et al. (2018).  
3 Open plurilateralism as an organizing concept is an element of the Government of New Zealand’s trade policy strategy. 
See Vitalis (2018).  
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mismatch between current developments in trade and the governance of the WTO and how conceptually 
to come to grips with it. 
OPAs are agreements authorizing regulatory authorities in various domains to cooperate to reduce 
the costs of exporting goods and services produced in their jurisdiction to other member countries,4 
subject to critical, continuing determination by the regulators themselves and their national political 
oversight bodies, that products and production processes meet evolving national standards. Cost 
reductions can be achieved when regulatory authorities accept, upon mutual examination, a 
determination by their counterparts that an exporter’s products conform to the importer’s standards, 
eliminating redundant compliance checking. Ultimately, going much further, authorities in OPA 
member countries may upon additional mutual scrutiny recognize that, differences in their respective 
standards or conformance tests notwithstanding, their systems produce equivalent decisions, making 
approval by one tantamount to approval by the other, subject again to continuing verification that this is 
the case. 
OPAs differ from PTAs in three ways. First, PTAs are comprehensive trade deals and thus entail 
cross-issue linkages.5 A commitment in domain A may, as part of an encompassing bargain, be 
compensated by concessions in domain B. OPAs are domain-specific: commitments or cooperation in 
one domain are not bargaining chips in negotiations about policies in others. Second, PTAs are enduring, 
detailed agreements, fixing the terms of trade for the foreseeable future, subject only to presumably 
marginal periodic adjustments. OPAs establish frameworks for continuing reciprocal review of existing 
regulatory standards and their implementation, and joint evaluation of potential alternatives and 
adaptions to new developments. Put another way, OPAs entrench particular values more deeply than 
PTAs, but treat the precise expression of those values in regulatory rules as more easily contestable and 
corrigible. Because they treat standards as values in themselves, expressive of deep and abiding social 
and political commitments, rather than counters in periodic rounds of trade bargaining, and because they 
institutionalize ongoing review of the interpretations and elaboration of those commitments, OPAs make 
it easier for nations to assert distinctive aspects of their sovereignty than PTAs. They also make it easier 
for polities, wary of elites that have proven inattentive to repercussions of globalization, to hold 
regulatory authorities and their political overseers to account. 
The third difference between PTAs and OPAs concerns the conditions under which countries not 
party to the original agreements can subsequently join. To conform to the rules of the WTO, so that 
parties to a PTA can be simultaneously members of the WTO, PTAs must be comprehensive, covering 
“substantially all trade” between the parties. To accede to a PTA a new member must agree to all the 
terms of the elaborate compromise struck by the original signatories. In practice this makes PTAs closed 
agreements. (Just how closed PTAs can be is demonstrated by Great Britain's difficulties withdrawing 
from the EU: all the commercially feasible alternatives to membership entail continuing, deep 
engagement with EU regulators—at odds with the reassertion of national sovereignty that motivated 
Brexit—and reestablishing deep regulatory cooperation after even a brief interruption would be 
prohibitively costly.)  
Because they are domain-specific, accession to an OPA requires a narrower and more limited 
commitment than a PTA. A candidate member must only undertake to meet the regulatory requirements 
established by OPA members as these apply to the particular class of goods or services covered by the 
agreement. Insofar as members of an OPA require only equivalent performance—not identical 
procedures or institutions—in conformance testing, standard setting and enforcement in each domain, 
they permit candidate members to produce the required regulatory outcome by the process best suited 
to their own traditions and conditions. In contrast to a PTA, accession to an OPA can be achieved 
                                                     
4 See e.g., OECD (2017) for a review of the significance of such costs. 
5 Issue linkage is a key feature of trade agreements and efforts to extend their coverage to nontrade issues such as domestic 
regulation. See e.g., Conconi and Perroni (2002); Limão (2005; 2016), Maggi (2016).  
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stepwise, with candidate members establishing the equivalence of their methods in one phase of the 
regulatory process, or one or another product of a particular class, then another, and another, so that 
trade expands and collaboration deepens even when full equivalence of regulatory systems is a distant 
goal. For all these reasons we call this type of plurilateral agreement open. 
Acknowledging OPAs as WTO-conforming could assist countries to reduce the international trade 
costs of regulatory heterogeneity and help regenerate the WTO as a forum for mutually beneficial 
cooperation on trade-related policies. Put starkly, the WTO has failed as a forum for preparing the 
(re-)negotiation of comprehensive trade deals. Its operation reflects the consensus of its members, while 
doing too little to shape it, or more modestly, even to aid members in the reconsideration of their 
positions. This could change if the WTO not only recognizes the legitimacy of OPAs – something that 
is currently the subject of lively debate among WTO members – but becomes a clearing house for 
comparing and diffusing their results and gradual expansion of membership. In principle, the WTO can 
provide a platform to support gradual multilateralization of OPAs through provision of technical support 
to candidate members and resolving disputes between OPAs and counties seeking to accede to them. 
Through the formation of OPAs with different geographic scope and substantive reach, groups of WTO 
member countries could both test and re-elaborate alternative regulatory standards and designs for 
institutional cooperation. The growth or decline of OPAs would demonstrate the attractiveness to 
newcomers of those that survive this winnowing. In this way OPAs, operating under auspices of the 
WTO would be dynamic and flexible vehicles by which member states come to reconsider their 
particular regulatory commitments and institutional habits in light of the experience of like-minded 
others. The most successful approaches could serve as the starting points for generalization and 
codification in international standards or international framework agreements of various kinds.  
A WTO hospitable to OPAs would no longer be hostage to the consensus of its members but be a 
partner in articulating it. A WTO that admitted of OPAs would create fora in which members could 
address commercially urgent, politically sensitive problems of regulatory coordination without 
embedding them in comprehensive deals spanning many policy areas, concluded in secrecy, and 
typically shielded from democratic accountability. Continuing reviews of agreements struck in such fora 
would bring to light and reconcile varying interpretation of norms before they result in conflicting 
enforcement strategies. By embracing OPAs the WTO would reduce the dangers of fragmentation from 
within and the risks of creating, at the margins of the global trade order, ad hoc, patchwork—and 
therefore typically fragile—regimes to deal with important collective action problems. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Part 2 discusses briefly how the successes of 
earlier rounds of trade liberalization and changes in the organization of production have made 
regulation—and importantly regulation requiring deep and continuing cooperation to establish the 
equivalence of trade partners’ regimes—an increasingly prominent issue in trade relations. We then 
present case studies of two kinds of regimes that most closely approximate OPAs, starting with the 
bottom-up development of the expansive regime to regulate trade in forest products. This type of regime 
is pluralistic, but incompletely integrated. Only recently has there been a proliferation of the institutions 
for mutual monitoring and review that would make for effective implementation and enforcement of its 
norms. Its development illustrates the possibilities but also the difficulties of achieving cooperation 
without any overarching institutional support of the kind inclusion in a reformed WTO could provide. 
Moreover, to better understand the operation of governance based on regulatory equivalence, we 
consider an alternate approximation to OPAs: bilateral regimes that are deeply integrated through joint 
review and deliberation. The case studies here are of food safety and civil aviation, typical of the kinds 
of arrangements, based on treaties or executive agreements, that have emerged ad hoc in response to the 
manifest need for close, regular collaboration in the absence of generally accepted methods for 
institutionalizing it. 
In Part 3 we take up the blockages in the WTO. For analytic purposes we distinguish immediate or 
proximate drivers of obstruction having to do with changes in the external environment and the WTO’s 
working practices from structural or root causes having to do with the very constitution of the WTO 
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itself as the embodiment of a particular understanding of how to regulate global trade. Among the 
proximate causes figure the redistribution of power from the advanced to developing countries, the 
backlash against trade as one emblem of a threatening globalization in many of the advanced countries, 
and the understanding of consensus rules that has come to be habitual in WTO decision making. Of the 
fundamental causes, most significant is surely the assumption that trade is self-evidently a global 
problem, and as such should be regulated by a single, comprehensive multilateral agreement, adopted 
and periodically renewed by consensus of the members acting as a sovereign body. From this it followed 
that the only international trade agreements compatible with the WTO itself are either those that 
effectively exclude other members but reflect comprehensive ambitions and “sovereign” legitimation 
on a smaller scale—PTAs, covering “substantially all trade” of signatories as homuncular versions of 
the WTO—or narrower, domain-specific agreements that can be nested in the WTO because they are 
subject explicitly or implicitly to consensus requirements of the body of members as a whole.  
Two options exist for such domain-specific agreements among a subset of the WTO membership: 
Plurilateral Agreements (PAs) allowing signatories to discriminate against nonparties if all WTO 
members assent to their registration, and critical mass agreements that, in contrast, do not require 
consensus because they do not discriminate against non-parties. The latter create free rider problems, 
because newcomers have the trade benefits accorded to the original parties without undertaking the 
regulatory adjustments required of the initiators. In Part 4 we turn to OPAs as an alternative form of 
smaller group cooperation. Precisely because OPAs authorize and encourage a process of consensus 
building and transformation that is (initially) partial, involving some but not all of the members, and are 
embedded in the routine operation of the WTO, rather than accorded the legitimating dignity of 
deliberation in a “constituent” or “sovereign” bargaining round, they seem to offend the very 
constitution of the WTO. We argue to the contrary. Because OPAs are provisional, placing regulatory 
cooperation under continuing democratic control, they are respectful of national sovereignty and thus 
deeply consistent with the legitimating principles of the WTO. Yet they also offer a mechanism for the 
generation of rich and reliable norms to guide commerce and, when necessary, direct adjudication. In 
regulatory affairs, as in advanced contracting among jointly innovating firms, the very process of 
determining whether each party’s efforts is serving the joint purpose clarifies that purpose, helps the 
parties better achieve it, and allows each to assess whether the other has the intention and capacity to do 
so. Put another way, and connecting our proposal for OPAs to a current of thought in international 
relations that reaches back to the work of Chayes and Chayes (1993; 1998) on the new sovereignty, the 
very articulation of norms touches off a process of social learning that helps the actors adhere to them, 
or understand early on—before much harm is done—that a counterpart will or cannot.  
2. International regulatory cooperation: the future is on the way 
Regulation has become more prominent in trade in part simply because earlier rounds of trade 
negotiations dramatically reduced tariffs. In trade between advanced countries tariffs in most goods are 
now at nuisance levels in that collection costs may exceed the revenue they produce. Regulations 
become more conspicuous as perceived barriers to trade because other restrictions have been removed. 
The deeper causes of the increased importance, and changing nature of regulation in trade are to be 
sought in three long-term changes in the organization of production generally, in agriculture or mining 
as well as many services and manufacturing industry. All are responses to the uncertainties created by 
unpredictable swerves in the direction of technological change and dramatic volatility in markets; they 
often are grouped together under the omnibus term globalization. 
2.1 Why regulation has become more prominent in trade 
The first is vertical dis-integration: The decomposition of production into discreet tasks (the manufacture 
of particular components, research and development, final assembly) accomplished by independent 
firms collaborating with many clients and linked to each other and the final producer in supply chains 
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(Baldwin, 2016). The more volatile and uncertain markets became, the riskier it was for vertically 
integrated producers to own component suppliers whose products could abruptly become obsolete 
because of unforeseen innovation or superfluous because of a shift in demand. The second is the 
globalization of supply chains. Production facilities are located where the costs of production are lowest, 
or where they can serve important markets with distinct characteristics. The third is the shift within these 
supply chains to just-in-time or continuous improvement production and design systems based on 
immediate error detection and correspondingly short learning cycles. Traditional producers hedged 
against breakdowns by holding large buffer inventories of work-in-progress. Uncertainty increased the 
cost of these hedges, just as it increased the costs of owning suppliers. Firms responded by eliminating 
the buffers—ideally producing one piece at a time. Breakdowns thus stop production, and operations 
only resume when the disruption is traced to its source and corrected.  
These dynamics have transformed trade, increasing the centrality of regulation and changing the 
scope and character of the regulator’s responsibility. Vertical disintegration and the rise of global supply 
chains produces enormous increases in intra-firm and intra-industry trade as exports are typically 
composed of many imported components and subassemblies. Just-in-time production makes delays and 
disruptions ruinously costly. Regulators must not only accommodate greatly increased trade volumes; 
their own operations must be as friction-free as the flows of goods and services they regulate. 
The changes in the organization of production put new burdens on regulators domestically and 
increase the need for collaboration with capable foreign peers. Globalization responds to and further 
accelerates the increased pace of innovation. Final producers, no longer limited by the technological 
choices of their internal production units, as in the days of vertical integration, collaborate with capable 
suppliers to rapidly combine novel technologies in new products. But more rapid innovation increases 
the risk of introducing latent hazards: hidden defects that go unnoticed when products initially are 
approved for sale. The regulator’s traditional emphasis on fixing, ex ante, conditions for market 
operators, and assuring compliance with them proves too limited. Ex ante or pre-marketing review and 
approval is being complemented by greatly increased attention to post-post-approval or ex post 
monitoring of the performance of the good or service in the market. This change is marked by the 
diffusion of requirements, mandated by public regulation and by private standards enforced by contract 
among supply chain partners, to report breakdowns in control that threaten the safety of products or 
production processes, to trace these incidents to their source and root cause, and to take corrective and 
preventative action. The just-in-time disciplines that enable smooth operation within supply chains also 
equip firms to detect and report such breakdowns. 
The need for an increased, and increasingly fine-meshed international regulatory cooperation follows 
directly. In a world where inputs are globally sourced and potentially hazardous products globally 
distributed, regulatory systems must encompass relevant trade partners to be effective. National 
regulatory systems that provide early warning of possible dangers in the goods traded among them, and 
respond quickly to breakdowns, must have confidence in one another’s oversight of the linked 
producers. Amidst rapid change that confidence can only be maintained by ongoing scrutiny of partners’ 
regulatory practices in particular domains and joint investigation and, perhaps mutual adjustment, when 
differences and failures are detected—all without jeopardizing the right of unilateral withdrawal from 
agreements that is the continuing prerogative of sovereignty. 
At its best, such international collaboration allows regulators routinely to reevaluate their own 
performance in the light of others’ successes and failures, improving on the ability of any national 
regime in isolation effectively to defend the values entrusted to it. When this is so, reductions in trade 
costs or increased market access and improvements in regulatory control of markets—reflecting shared 
values and respect for persisting differences—can be complementary, not conflicting. Moreover, and 
more surprising, given that trade negotiations are often decried today as a technocratic conspiracy 
against national traditions and the popular will, the continuing and searching mutual examination by 
regulatory equivalence creates novel possibilities for transparent and publicly accountable decision 
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making, and thus for reconciling sovereign self-determination with the stepwise extension of economic 
exchange and regulatory cooperation. 
The pressure for deep international regulatory cooperation of this kind is most urgently felt where 
the risks of latent hazards, introduced inadvertently by technological change or by the guile of bad actors 
seeking to profit from deception, are the greatest. Something of this cooperation goes on under the aegis 
of PTAs. But these pressures can result in stand-alone institutional arrangements under two, contrary 
sets of conditions. If exporting countries and importing countries have sharply different interests that 
also diverge within each group, the result is a piecemeal regime or regime complex of the kind observed 
in forestry and palm products. If, on the contrary, exporters and importers have largely overlapping 
interests—much trade is intra industry, each country producing components or variants of what the other 
producers—the result can be a bilateral agreement to seek regulatory equivalence. We take up these 
cases in turn. 
2.2 The problems and possibilities of building an ad hoc regime 
Deforestation accelerates climate change, destroys irreplaceable habitats, and dislocates communities of 
first peoples and other forest dwellers. It was almost self-evident that protection of forests by limiting 
illegal logging and trade in illegally logged timber would figure prominently in the reform agenda that 
emerged as concern for the environment first crested politically in the early 1990s. Regime building in 
this domain has proceeded by fits and starts and in bits and pieces. The closer the institutional set up 
gets to being fully operational, the clearer it becomes that its effectiveness will depend on the kind of 
deep and continuing regulatory cooperation increasingly central to (but buried within) PTAs and more 
clearly exposed in the bilateral arrangements to be described next. Whether the current arrangements 
can formalize the required mutual monitoring and review is an open question.6 At the least developments 
in regulation of trade in illegal logging suggest that it may be possible, under favorable conditions, to 
create a plurilateral regime with many of the characteristics of an OPA outside (though in conformity 
with) the WTO, but that the coordination costs of such ad hoc solutions are likely to be dauntingly high. 
The potential gains from creating an institutional scaffolding to reduce those costs through economies 
of scale and scope in institution building are correspondingly great.  
Early efforts to secure a legally binding, comprehensive convention on forest preservation failed at 
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. In the aftermath the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), a British 
NGO, recognizing the immediate limits of public action, convened stakeholders representing the private 
sector, environmental organizations, and vulnerable communities—grouped in separate “chambers” and 
balanced between the Northern and Southern hemispheres—to establish, in the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), an organization for setting voluntary standards for forest preservation and a system for 
demonstrating compliance with them. Broad, continuing international discussion under the auspices of 
the World Bank, the UN Intergovernmental Forum on Forests and the G8 of the need for extensive 
reform of forestry governance in timber exporting countries in addition to voluntary standards and 
certification emboldened the EU to unilaterally advance the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT) action plan in 2003. Under pressure from NGOs, some exporters and new legislation in 
the US (the Lacey Act), that measure was reinforced by an EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) a decade 
later. FLEGT created preferential or expedited access to the EU single market for countries—all 
developing—that cooperate with the EU in fostering sustainable forestry and deterring illegal logging. 
The EUTR creates important incentives for the extension of these cooperative efforts, and for 
compliance with the obligations arising under them by imposing potentially substantial penalties on 
firms that introduce timber into the EU from non-cooperating exporters, or that fail to exercise due 
diligence in ascertaining that the products they commercialize in fact meet the agreed requirements. 
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Under FLEGT, wood-exporting countries are invited to enter bilateral Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPAs) with the EU. A party to a VPA agrees to review and periodically revise its current 
forestry law and administration with national stakeholders to achieve the aims of FLEGT and 
international agreements to which it is a signatory; it must also establish a corresponding timber legality 
assurance system (TLAS)—under the oversight of an independent auditor, but increasingly with civil 
society participation—to ensure the revised legal requirements are respected from harvesting to export. 
For its part the EU, to induce agreement to the terms of VPA, facilitates access for FLEGT licensed 
timber to its market and supports (with the help of donor institutions with the requisite expertise) the 
capacity building of public and private actors needed for compliance. A joint committee of 
representatives of the EU and the partner country monitor implementation of the agreement and settle 
disputes not so intractable as to require arbitration. The joint committee may also recommend 
adjustments to the agreement, for example in relation to provision of capacity-building services. That 
the agreements are formally voluntary, jointly governed and provide technical and adjustment 
assistance. This assuaged concerns about the WTO conformity of the VPAs and helped win the assent 
of developing countries, whose opposition had earlier frustrated negotiation of a global forest 
convention. 
The Lacey Act amendment and the EUTR produced a cascade of responses that, as intended, 
increased the scope and grip of the new protections. As of 2018, seven countries including Cameroon, 
the Central African Republic, and Liberia in Africa; Guyana and Honduras in Latin America and 
Indonesia and Vietnam in South-east Asia had agreed VPAs. Formal negotiations or preparations for 
negotiations are underway with eight more, similarly distributed geographically. If all these negotiations 
succeed, VPA countries will account for close to 80 percent of global trade and EU imports of tropical 
wood products. Other advanced countries, including Australia and South Korea have enacted outright 
prohibitions or legislation with deterrent effect on the import of illegally harvested wood.7 The leading 
transnational private forest certification organizations, such as the FSC, have adjusted their standards to 
meet EUTR requirements. 
Increasing participation in the emergent regime has not been matched by advances in effective 
administration and enforcement. On the contrary, both VPA partner countries and counterpart 
authorities in the EU and its member states have struggled to comply with their obligations under the 
agreements, though the pace of progress seems to have increased recently. It took Indonesia, the first 
country to export FLEGT-licensed timber, nine years from the start of negotiations with the EU to 
establish a reliable process for doing so; in Ghana, which is expected to follow suit shortly, 
implementation has taken longer still—and these are the leaders in their cohort. Within the EU, member 
states were slow to establish competent authorities (CAs), which are responsible under the EUTR for 
investigating “substantiated concerns” regarding trade in illegal timber reported by third parties, 
typically civil society organizations; even where CAs existed, they were often slow to develop 
procedures for verifying operators’ compliance with their due-diligence responsibilities. It took four 
years and a combination of infringement proceedings against stragglers, additional guidance and 
revisions in the regulation itself to bring essentially all member state into compliance. Only recently has 
there been an increase in enforcement activities ranging from assessments of due-diligence systems and 
requests for corrective action to the imposition of fines. 
These delays and difficulties should not be surprising. As development banks and donor 
organizations know too well it is fiendishly difficult to build state capacity in ministries in national 
capitals; it is still harder to build capacity in the remote provinces—far from central authority, often 
governed by local satraps whose livelihood is trafficking of various kinds—where illegal logging, and 
its concealment by the generation of false documents, is often a mainstay of the economy. Problem 
solving in such settings, as is typically the case with regulation of latent harms, proceeds in steps, with 
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successive, apparent solutions repeatedly revealing new facets of the initial difficulty until root causes 
can be exposed and addressed. Not uncovering unexpected difficulties in the prolonged, initial phases 
of such investigation is more likely a sign of self-deception than precocious success. The source of the 
EU’s difficulties in complying with its own requirements is no mystery either. When the EUTR came 
into effect the member states had no national systems for making the determinations of the legality of 
newly marketed wood products expected of exporters under the regulation. Such systems had to be 
constructed from scratch with the EU even as the definitions of legality and procedures for ascertaining 
conformity were taking shape in the VPA discussions. Here too reports of rapid, frictionless compliance, 
had there been any, should have triggered suspicion, not self-satisfaction. 
Recent assessments of the FLEGT Action Plan by the European Court of Auditors in 2015 and an 
independent evaluation team a year later make clear that further progress in implementation and 
enforcement will depend on intensified cooperation of the actors within the EU and between them and 
the actors in the VPAs taken separately and together. The new initiatives include joint assessments of 
progress with the partner countries to establish multi-year roadmaps for implementation and monitoring; 
creation of tools for early detection of problems; and, in partnership with expert, outside organizations, 
programs to extract and make available for general use practical lessons of experience under the VPAs 
in areas such as shipment testing and timber traceability. 
These initiatives mesh with and reinforce an explosion of institutionalized cooperation induced by 
the growing awareness of failures in implementation and enforcement. The European Commission, for 
example, convenes the CAs five times a year in an EUTR/FLEGT Expert Group to review EUTR 
enforcement, make authoritative determinations in disputes between producer countries and CAs, and 
pool information with the aim of defining best practices and issuing guidance. The CAs have on their 
own established an informal enforcement network, with a confidential website for sharing inspection 
reports, and notifications of substantiated concerns of illegality. Sub-groups of CAs have begun to map 
supply chains in high-risk countries and assess the adequacy of companies’ due-diligence procedures. 
This cooperation extends to joint training and inspections; it is increasingly formalized in regular, 
regional exchanges among CAs from, for example, the Nordic and Baltic countries and the 
Mediterranean. Finally, both the Commission and the CAs cooperate more and more closely with 
regulators in the Timber Regulation Enforcement Exchange (TREE), a network connecting public 
officials, civil society organizations, and business representatives in the EU, US, Australia, Canada, and 
East Asia along with officials from Interpol to review enforcement developments in high-risk regions. 
TREE discussions for example led the US Department of Justice to introduce EUTR due diligence 
requirements into the consent decree entered with a firm alleged to have imported illegal timber, 
although these requirements are not anticipated in the amended Lacey Act. 
The end of the coordination problems is not in sight. To note one of many pressing issues: the EUTR 
encourages operators to rely on qualified, private legality standard setters and verification organizations 
such as the FSC, while assigning continuing responsibility for ascertaining the reliability of private 
system. It is unclear how far that responsibility extends; at the limit, ad absurdum, the operator would 
have to make its own legality checks to confirm the validity of the audit system’s certifications, 
rendering the latter pointless. Enforcement of the EUTR is the responsibility of member state CAs and 
courts. Even if CAs follow common guidance with respect to this and other questions of interpretation, 
courts disagree in their interpretation of regulations, exposing operators to what seems to them, 
understandably, arbitrary differences in liability.8 Some method of harmonizing judgements as well as 
guidance will have to be found, or even well intentioned actors will despair of participating. Given the 
continuing and in many respects unforeseeable changes in supply chains and environmental 
understanding and other imponderables, problems of this type will be unending, or, rather, continue in 
ever new forms. “Stabilizing” the regime will require further development of the institutions of 
continuous coordination now proliferating of the kind that would be provided by an OPA, as we will 
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describe below. If they were to succeed, these cooperative measures would likely transform the forest 
protection thatching into a novel, plurilateral variant, outside the WTO, of the bilateral mutual-
equivalence regimes discussed next. 
2.3. Regulatory equivalence in trade: bilateral regimes 
The steps leading to the Food Safety Systems Recognition Arrangement—a declaration of regulatory 
equivalency—recently signed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, and the Department of Health of Canada provides another illustration of the general 
tendencies prompting closer regulatory coordination. Above all, a look at the process of establishing 
equivalence draws attention to exacting reciprocal scrutiny of regulatory ends and means—and thus 
presumptively to heightened possibilities for domestic review and accountability in the partner 
countries—needed to establish confidence that equivalence can work.  
In the US, outbreaks of food-borne illness transmitted by leafy greens (especially dangerous because 
often eaten raw) led California wholesalers to create in 2006 a regime—contractual, but enforced by a 
state inspectorate—requiring growers to conduct a hazard analysis of the critical control points 
(HACCP) review of their farms, identifying the points at which pathogens could enter the production 
process, and proposing and testing methods of avoiding or mitigating those risks. The Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) of 2010 codified this regime, extended it to many more products under the 
jurisdiction of the FDA and established procedures for responding to breakdowns in controls. As the US 
was modernizing its food safety legislation, Canada was doing the same: like the FSMA, the Safe Food 
for Canadians Act (SFCA), passed in 2012, mandated HACCP controls for the entire supply chain, 
incident reporting and traceability; and like the FSMA the SFCA anticipated close cooperation with the 
regulators in key trading partners. For both countries, the determination proceeded in two steps: first, a 
careful desk review of the partner’s standards and procedures to ascertain how general organizational 
goals are translated into specific standards and routines, and to verify that the routines are routinely 
followed. Then observation by field teams of the partner’s audit of a range of food-processing plants 
and reference laboratories to understand how experience on the ground is translated into decisions and 
documents. 
The FDA’s desk review began with the development of an International Comparability Assessment 
Tool (ICAT) for assessing the robustness of a trading partner’s food safety system in ten domains such 
as inspections and responses to outbreaks of food-related illness.9 A capable partner authority is 
expected to conduct “periodic self-assessments and quality assurance reviews” of its inspection and 
other programs to “determine areas or functions…that need improvement, to develop improvement 
plans and to establish timelines for implementing improvements;” similarly a robust food-safety system 
is expected to include periodic review of enforcement actions “to assess areas in need of improvement 
or corrective action,” and update “policies and practices based on findings.” The ICAT review also 
included presentation by Canadian officials at the national and provincial levels of case studies that, 
starting with source documents such as audit reports, documented the chain of decision making in 
particular product recalls and enforcement actions against firms, allowing the US reviewers to determine 
whether the information generated by the Canadian food-safety system was effectively used to serve its 
expressed goals. This extended desk review was then complemented by weeks of site visits in which a 
pair of three-member, interdisciplinary US teams (one in the West of Canada, one in the East) prepared 
to shadow Canadian inspectors in various plants by reviewing their training records, then observed the 
actual inspection of processing facilities, with attention to the records consulted and interactions with 
key managers. The entire process is meticulously described in a report in which the FDA reviewers 
                                                     
9 The following draws is based on the FDA’s presentation of ICAT, at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/InternationalInteragencyCoordination/UCM331177.pdf. 
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recommend “a positive finding of system recognition”—current FDA lingo for a determination of 
regulatory equivalence.10 
As a second example illustrating the trajectory and governance mechanisms of sectoral regulatory 
collaboration based on continuing mutual scrutiny, consider the agreement on “cooperation in the 
regulation of civil aviation safety” or Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) entered into by the 
US and EU in 2011.11 Civil aviation is, like pharmaceuticals, among the most rigorously and 
successfully regulated industries: passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-kilometers flown 
globally in commercial air transport fell from 0.8 in 1960 to 0.08 in 1980 and 0.03 in 1990; since then 
it has ranged between 0.05 and 0.01.12 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), formed 
under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation in 1944, provides the framework for 
international regulation in the sector. ICAO establishes a “mutual acceptance” regime in which the 
certification by one signatory that equipment or flight crews under its jurisdiction meet ICAO standards 
is accepted by other signatories. Mutual acceptance does not amount to agreement of regulatory 
equivalence for three reasons. First, ICAO only establishes minimum standards; more demanding 
jurisdictions such as the US, EU, Japan, China, Brazil and Canada insist on more rigorous ones. Second, 
innovation outpaces the capacity of ICAO’s 191 member states to establish new standards, so, for 
example, it may be impossible to certify designs for next generation equipment under ICAO. Third, 
even when standards are available and acceptable to all parties, the capacity and willingness to engage 
in conformance testing varies greatly among the signatories, and some will not accept the certifications 
of the others.13 
For all these reasons the states insistent on higher civil aviation standards enter bilateral agreements 
with peers. Beginning in 1996, the US negotiated BASA’s formal framework agreements in which the 
partner countries by treaty or executive order authorize their respective air safety authorities (called 
Technical Agents or TAs) to examine and review each other’s practices and treat those found equivalent 
as common technical implementation procedures (TIPs) for certification purposes. Of these agreements 
the EU-US BASA, covering principally the airworthiness of equipment from design to manufacture and 
maintenance, as well as conformity to environmental standards, is the most comprehensive and 
developed, with a formal governance structure for resolution of disputes and possible extension of the 
agreement to additional areas of air safety.14 
Like the ICAO, the EU-US BASA establishes the principle of mutual acceptance, but in a distinctive 
sense: each party insists on compliance with its own, distinct standards, but agrees to rely “to the 
maximum extent practicable” on the other party’s certifications that its products or services do so.15 
Formally this means that an Airbus designed in the EU must be certified by the TA in the EU, the 
European Air Safety Agency (EASA) as meeting the airworthiness or “type” requirements of the TA in 
the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and that a maintenance station in the US repairing 
Airbus equipment must be certified by the FAA as meeting EASA standards.  
In practice and by design, this kind of reciprocal acceptance of compliance certifications shades into 
collaboration and de facto recognition of the equivalence of many standards. With regard to maintenance 
                                                     
10 FDA, Report of the Systems Recognition Assessment of Canada, ND, at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/InternationalInteragencyCoordination/UCM503960.pdf. 
11 EU-US BASA, International Agreements Council Decision of 7 March 2011 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation 
safety, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:64d9e1a2-633c-4e91-bbf5-
053e5ab1b432.0010.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
12 See ICAO (2017).  
13 See Jennison (2013, pp. 333-50); Eisner and Parker (2016).  
14 See Jennison (2013, pp. 338-9). 
15 See EU-US BASA (2011, Annex 1, 3.2.4). 
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stations, each authority determined before entering the agreement that the other’s basic system for 
quality control and reporting was equivalent to its own, and listed separately in the maintenance annex 
to the BASA a small number of “special conditions”: “requirements [in the relevant regulation of either 
party] that have been found, based on a comparison of the regulatory maintenance systems, not to be 
common to both systems and are significant enough that they must be addressed.”16 Thus EASA can 
certify a repair facility in the EU performing work on US equipment as meeting FAA requirements only 
if it complies with EASA’s standards and meets the special conditions defined by the FAA.17 
Similarly, in certifying the design of new aircraft types, the authorities first determined the 
equivalence of their respective methods of ascertaining an organization’s qualification to produce 
reliable aircraft designs and a manufacture’s capacity to maintain a reliable quality control system, and 
then provided for the exceptional cases where equivalence cannot be presumed. For example, early in 
the design process, when encountering novel, unregulated design elements (also called “special 
conditions”)18 the FAA and EASA, separately or together, can issue new standards maintaining “a level 
of safety equivalent to that established in the [existing] regulations”; likewise, either authority can waive 
the obligation to conform with a particular certification requirement when differences are thought to be 
inconsequential, or find that different design features or test methods achieve an “equivalent level of 
safety.” Only if a difference in the scope and stringency of requirements does not fall under one of these 
exceptions will one of the authorities find a “Significant Standards Difference” and (if further discussion 
does not resolve the issue) declare the difference a “validation item,” meaning that it will test for itself 
whether the other party has made an adjustment that meets its standard.19 Regulatory cooperation in the 
sense of enlarging the scope of reciprocal acceptance also extends to consideration of deep changes in 
the nature of design standards—for example, from specifications of permissible equipment to 
specifications of the level of performance the proposed equipment must attain—that reflect the broad 
changes in the organization of production and the overall context of regulation set out above. 
The governance structure created by the Agreement is accordingly designed to encourage resolution 
of disputes arising under current arrangements but also to extend regulatory cooperation. As its name 
indicates, the Bilateral Oversight Board, including representatives of the TA’s (and, for the EU, 
representatives of the member state regulatory authorities with continuing air safety jurisdiction), 
reviews progress under the BASA and sets the agenda for further reform. It is the final arbiter of disputes 
and has explicit authority to approve new, domain-specific annexes. A Certification Oversight Board, 
composed of representatives of the TA’s with expertise in airworthiness certification and environmental 
testing, and a Joint Maintenance Coordination Board, with TA representatives whose expertise is in 
repair, coordinate the technical discussions between the authorities in their respective domains and 
whenever possible resolve disputes arising from those discussions, referring only intractable ones to the 
Bilateral Oversight Body. This ensures that disputes are normally resolved at relatively low levels of the 
administrative structure, by persons likely to have deep knowledge of the issues, rather than by higher 
authorities with limited understanding of current practices. If a party, after the fruitless pursuit of a 
remedy, loses confidence in a class of approvals issued by the other, it suspends acceptance of only that 
kind of approval, without disturbing the remainder of the agreement. Because of this severability, each 
authority understands that the other could indeed act on a particularly vehement objection to a test or 
standard without fear of precipitating a political crisis; the credibility of this threat has a deterrent effect 
that reduces the chances that the power of partial suspension being exercised. 
                                                     
16 See EU-US BASA (2011, Annex 2X.5). 
17 See EASA/FAA (2011). 
18 See EASA/FAA, Technical Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness and Environmental Certification between the 
Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America and the European Aviation Safety Agency of the 
European Union, at: 
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/media/EUTIP.pdf. 
19 See Eisner and Parker (2016, p. 24). 
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Are civil aviation and food safety exceptional cases, not examples of general tendencies in the 
development of regulation and regulatory cooperation? A recent study cautions against generalization, 
arguing that the role of ICAO as an international standard setter and the high degree of ex post liability 
for aviation accidents—the near certainty that negligence will be uncovered and heavily sanctioned—
make the case unusual, if not singular.20 But industry-specific organizations with the authority to set 
minimum standards for their members and to frame the agenda for further reform are today pervasive, 
if not ubiquitous. The Codex Alimentarius plays this role globally for food safety (helping to diffuse 
HACCP-based regulation), as does the International Maritime Organization in maritime safety, and the 
International Conference on Harmonization in the area of pharmaceutical regulation, initially among 
regulators in the US, EU and Japan, and now globally. Such organizations do not displace national, 
bilateral or (mega-)regional regulation any more than ICAO displaces the FAA, EASA or the results of 
their cooperation under the EU-US BASA. In all these cases the “global” standard setter, whatever its 
actual scope, provides an invaluable forum for crystalizing consensus, exposing new ideas and initiatives 
to informed criticism, generalizing successes and at times calling attention to egregious cases of non-
compliance with minimal norms. But whatever their exact role, these organizations are a common 
feature in the current regulatory landscape, not a distinctive outcropping that can explain the outcome 
in civil aviation or any other particular sector. 
Ex post liability too is becoming commonplace. The spread of incident reporting systems, including 
the obligation to trace serious defects to their source, together with the spread of just-in-time production 
makes it harder and harder to escape liability for negligence: faults are registered in the course of 
production and failure, especially repeated and systematic failure, to take corrective action makes it 
difficult to disclaim liability. Imminent changes, suggested again by the trajectory of civil air regulation, 
could well make liability all but inescapable. Through the 1970s improvements in air safety largely 
resulted from investigation of aircraft accidents. As the number of accidents declined, reports of 
incidents—out-of-control events that could lead to accidents—spurred further improvements. As the 
number of incidents declines ICAO now argues that emergent hazards are best detected by continuous, 
real-time monitoring of engines and aircraft.21 This example, too, could be multiplied. 
Nonetheless, the cases presented might be exceptional on other grounds. However much they might 
ramify—aircraft safety involves design, manufacturing, maintenance and operations; food safety spans 
farms, processing, retail distribution—these domains may be discrete or bounded in the sense that they 
do not implicate what we might think of roughly as core sovereign prerogatives such as the monopoly 
control of force or the power of taxation. Regulation in other areas might, however, lead to such a 
“sovereigntist” ascent, the anticipation of which might stop efforts at mutual accommodation through 
regulatory equivalence before, or as they begin. A case in point might be banking and other financial 
services, where, as the recent financial crisis showed, failures of regulation in one jurisdiction can be 
rapidly transmitted to others, with catastrophic consequences. Within the EU, for instance, efforts to 
establish regulatory equivalence in banking may have touched off such an upward progression. To list 
only the most prominent reforms under discussion: regulatory equivalence requires equivalent systems 
of deposit insurance, of resolution of insolvent banks, of common, risk-adjusted capital reserve 
requirements (which must be compatible with Basel IV international standards now under construction) 
and of a “single rule book” for evaluating the underwriting practices of systematically important and 
ordinary banks.22 Perhaps these regulatory domains are so intertwined that they can only be managed 
by a single, central authority, so the search for mutual adjustment through regulatory equivalence results 
in the creation of a de facto banking or financial-markets sovereign, if not a new sovereign tout court? 
If there were many such domains regulatory equivalence would remain marginal and the choice might 
                                                     
20 See Eisner and Parker (2016). 
21 See Ratajczyk (2011, p. 401); Jennison (2013, pp. 349-50). 
22 See generally on EU banking reform: Ferran (2014, pp. 16-34); Zeitlin (2016, pp. 1077-83). 
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be, in fact, between a global technocracy and more or less democratically accountable megaregional 
ones. 
The main counter consideration is that under uncertainty, regulatory homogeneity is unacceptably 
risky. Imposing uniform rules (for example, treating sovereign debt as riskless) is a recipe for disaster 
when, as all but inevitably happens, some of the uniform rules are inapplicable or unintentionally induce 
risky behavior themselves. By the same token, uniform requirements choke off the exploration of 
diverse, contextualized responses to local conditions and with them the possibilities of mutual learning 
that, as argued repeatedly here, is indispensable to rapid adjustment under uncertainty. Such 
considerations are very much in evidence in the EU debate on banking reform, as counterweights to 
arguments for centralization and uniformity. The Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism for European Banks (European Central Bank), which helps create the 
framework for and monitors the results of banking supervision in Member States, cautioned against 
“pursuing a one-size-fits-all supervision” in favor of an approach that ensures “consistency across 
institutions and supervision tailored to credit institutions’ specificities” to “accommodate banking 
diversity”—considered to be “very desirable from a financial stability perspective.”23 How to 
institutionalize a framework maintaining consistency while allowing and learning from diversity—the 
stuff of regulatory equivalence—remains open question in this and other domains. But in this case, at 
least, the apparent exception accords with the rule.24 
Under the EU's leadership international regulatory cooperation in data privacy may well develop in 
analogous ways, with important spillovers in competition law. These examples, together with the 
extensive but incomplete changes in the governance of trade in forest products discussed earlier, are too 
numerous, and each too important in its right, to be outliers. They are more likely to be forerunners. For 
now, we simply regard them as illustrative of the broad changes reshaping regulatory cooperation as 
regulation becomes more and more central to trade.  
3. The WTO: stuck in a rut? 
The WTO is not adapting to these changes. It struggles to perform routine, core functions such as dispute 
resolution and the provision of current, complete and correct information on national trade policies. Its 
ability to fulfill its mandate is in question.25 The WTO’s prospects as a convener of trade negotiations 
are likewise threatened, although as noted below there are nascent green shoots associated with the 
launch of initiatives that could evolve into OPAs. Members failed to conclude the first round of 
multilateral trade negotiations launched under WTO auspices in 2001, the Doha Development Agenda. 
The failure of the Doha round in turn has precluded discussion of a new work program that includes the 
regulatory subjects increasingly central to polities and international business. Instead, this was taken up 
by many countries in the context of PTAs.26 
The WTO has been deadlocked by shifts in the power balance among its members, by working 
practices that magnify the paralyzing effects of those shifts, and by constitutional limits on the 
acceptable forms of international cooperation within the global trade regime. The new, unstable balance 
or imbalance of power will persist, but recent developments suggest the constitutional understanding of 
the WTO may be interpreted more permissively, to allow precisely the kinds of deep international 
regulatory cooperation among groups of countries, without the prior consent of all members, that could 
lead by means of OPAs and other instruments to the elaboration of norms and procedures which could 
in time become broadly consensual.  
                                                     
23 See Nouy (2015). 
24 For in-depth discussion of this area, see Ferran (2014; 2018) and Moloney (2018).  
25 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) for an in-depth discussion. 
26 See, for example, Bollyky (2017), Chase and Pelkmans (2015), and Mumford (2014, 2018).  
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The redistribution within the WTO of power, from the advanced countries that presided over the 
creation of the organization to the countries with rapidly growing economies that now contend for 
influence within it, is common knowledge. Developing and emerging economies have come to account 
for almost half of the value of global merchandise trade and global GDP. Many rapidly advancing 
countries no longer suffer the hegemony of the founding powers, such as the US; China openly 
challenges it. Nor are the former hegemons eager to reassert their authority within the multilateral system 
of their own creation. While growth in international trade, cross-border investment and knowledge flows 
have supported major reductions in global poverty and increased real incomes of hundreds of millions 
of people in low-income countries, these developments have coincided with a decline in relatively 
unskilled employment in manufacturing in OECD member countries. For many trade has become a 
potent symbol of a congeries of alarming and apparently uncontrollable technological, economic and 
political changes. In virtually all advanced countries, broad coalitions of parties and civil society groups 
on the left and the right oppose trade agreements and the WTO as visible embodiments of globalization.  
To the burdens on decision making created by the assertiveness of rising powers and the hesitations 
of the former hegemon must be added the burdens that result from WTO decision-making conventions, 
especially the working practice that decisions are to be taken by (unanimous) consensus, and the 
convention that developing countries are to be accorded special and differential treatment (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2018). The first permits any WTO member to veto initiatives and block efforts that seek to go 
beyond the issues agreed to comprise the (stalled) Doha Development Agenda. The second has allowed 
advanced developing countries to offer less than full reciprocity in trade negotiations and the application 
of certain WTO rules. Such systematically lop-sided arrangements are no longer acceptable to many 
high-income countries, first and foremost the US. But many developing countries view special and 
differential treatment as a basic feature of the bargain underpinning the WTO.  
Decision by consensus is especially revealing of the self-understanding of the WTO because it holds 
sway in disregard of the formal admissibility of other procedures. Majority voting is allowed under the 
WTO’s governing statues, but voting does not occur. To vote, it is widely held, would undermine the 
legitimacy of WTO decisions.27 Countries large and small rely on the consensus practice as a guarantee 
that the results of negotiations are acceptable to them, ensuring the ‘ownership’ of the WTO by members 
and their polities. Thus legitimated, consensus decision-making is also used to block activities that have 
nothing to do with negotiations, such as setting the agenda of committee meetings or proposals to discuss 
a trade policy-related matter that is not covered by a WTO agreement or not part of the Doha 
Development Agenda. The result has been that new rule making has largely migrated to PTAs, rather 
than being conducted under the auspices of the WTO. 
The same insistence that substantial additions or departures from existing rules—lawmaking—
requires (unanimous) consensus among the members sharply limits the forms of international 
cooperation in trade that the WTO recognizes as compatible with membership in the general body of 
the organization. Three options currently exist for groups of WTO members to collaborate on a policy 
area.28 First, PTAs, the most familiar, are economic integration agreements in which signatories 
liberalize substantially all trade in goods (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. XXIV) 
                                                     
27 Some WTO provisions specify consensus as the decision-making rule, e.g., Art. X:9 on amendments to include new 
Annex 4 Plurilateral Agreements. Art. IX WTO specifies that if voting occurs, unanimity is required for amendments 
relating to general principles such as non-discrimination; a three-quarters majority for Interpretations of provisions of the 
WTO agreements and decisions on waivers; and a two-thirds majority for amendments relating to issues other than 
general principles. Where not otherwise specified and consensus cannot be reached a simple majority vote is sufficient. 
Art. X provides that a member cannot be bound by a vote on an amendment that alters its rights or obligations and that it 
opposes. In such instances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to request that the member concerned withdraw from 
the WTO or to grant it a waiver. 
28 The term plurilateral is sometimes used to describe all three of these possibilities, giving rise to potential confusion. For 
in-depth discussion of WTO-consistent cooperation among subsets of WTO members see Lawrence (2006) and Hoekman 
and Mavroidis (2015; 2017). 
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and/or remove substantially all discrimination against each other’s providers of services across a broad 
range of sectors (General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Art. V). Second, critical mass 
agreements (CMAs), in which a group of countries agrees to specific policy commitments that are 
inscribed into their WTO schedules and apply on a non-discriminatory basis to all WTO members. 
Third, Plurilateral Agreements (PAs) (under Art II:3 WTO), in which a club agrees to undertake specific 
commitments in a policy area and restricts the benefits of cooperation to club members.  
The major example of a WTO CMA is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). This abolishes 
tariffs on information technology products. The ITA has 82 participants, including the 28 EU member 
states, and has increased global trade substantially in electronic products.29 CMAs have also been 
concluded for services sectors – an example is a Reference Paper on regulation of basic 
telecommunications whose signatories commit to apply specific regulatory disciplines on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all WTO members.30 Negotiations on a possible Environmental Goods 
Agreement spanning the EU and 17 other WTO members are an example of an ongoing critical mass 
negotiation.31  
The disciplines established by CMAs apply only to the subset of WTO member countries that sign 
on to them; but the benefits extend on a most-favored-nation basis to all members, including those that 
do not participate. Because commitments are implemented on a nondiscriminatory basis such 
agreements do not require consensus for incorporation into the WTO – those WTO members that decide 
to join a CMA can simply inscribe the provisions of the agreement into their schedules of commitments 
under the GATT and/or the GATS, as appropriate (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017). The two key 
features of CMAs are that they are open – the presumption is that any WTO member can participate if 
it desires to, whether as part of the group that initially agrees to pursue cooperation on a matter, or after 
the establishment of an agreement – and that they are applied on a MFN basis. OPAs are a form of 
CMA. 
CMAs differ from the third type of agreement—WTO Art. II.3 PAs—in that the benefits of PAs can 
be limited to signatories. The main example of a PA is the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). 
Because WTO PAs can apply in a discriminatory manner, their incorporation into the WTO is subject 
to the approval of all WTO members, including those that do not join. Art. X.9 WTO stipulates that the 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO may decide to add a new Plurilateral Agreement to the existing ones 
‘exclusively by consensus’. Thus, the bar for adoption of new PAs is very high, as consensus allows any 
one member to block the incorporation of a new agreement. 
Each of these three forms of cooperation among groups of WTO members respects the consensus 
principle—the juri-generative capacities of the members of the WTO in their unanimity—but does so 
in different ways. PTAs honor the principle by emulation, adopting it as their own: They are formed by 
a comprehensive consensus of the parties that mirrors in the scope of the topics it covers, but not the 
extent of its membership, the ideal of the WTO itself—a consensus within a consensus. CMAs are 
exempted from application of the consensus principle but only because they only create new facilities 
for nonparties, and never limit existing ones. As a result, they are not deemed to require assent of the 
sovereign body of members. The situation of PAs is the reverse. They do limit the rights of nonparties, 
and therefore are subject to consensus requirements so onerous they are seldom met.  
To some extent the WTO already incorporates elements of regulatory cooperation on the lines of 
OPAs, and recent developments suggest substantial, further opening. For example, the WTO agreements 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures call on members 
to base their product regulation on international standards where these exist. Since international standard 
                                                     
29 See Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn (2018) for estimates of the global trade impact of the ITA. 
30 Eighty-two WTO members have signed the Reference Paper. See 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm.  
31 Negotiations commenced in July 2014. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm.  
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setting has some of the aspects of mutual interrogation and continuous adjustment characteristic of 
OPAs, the TBT and SPS provisions can be thought of as an obligation to incorporate the output of OPAs 
into member regulation when possible.32 The obligation is not binding. WTO members are free to use 
national product standards as long as these do not restrict trade unnecessarily and are applied on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. But the presumption is that if international standards are used these cannot be 
contested. In the same vein provisions in the TBT agreement and the GATS encourage WTO members 
to establish mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). MRAs concluded between two or more WTO 
members must be open to participation by additional members who meet requirements: closed MRAs 
are explicitly prohibited– again a key feature of any OPA.  
The December 2017 Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires announced a more direct challenge to 
the convention of consensus. Different groups of WTO members launched discussions on four new 
areas: on policies to assist micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs); e-commerce; 
investment facilitation; and domestic regulation of services. WTO members that joined these groups 
demonstrated that the consensus working practice cannot be used to prevent groups of countries 
discussing issues of common interest.33 These initiatives offer hope for multilateral cooperation on the 
model of the OPA, and with it the possibility of the regeneration of the WTO as an institution. The 
agreement among 76 WTO members at the 2019 annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in 
Davos to launch negotiations on rules to govern e-commerce and associated cross-border data flows 
illustrates this may be the shape of things to come.34  
4. OPAs: sovereignty-preserving international regulatory cooperation 
The account above of the process of establishing elements of mutual recognition between Food Safety 
Canada and the USDA and of the operation of the US-EU BASA counts as a kind of existence proof of 
OPAs. They can work in practice. But, reprising an old philosophers’ joke, we might wonder whether 
they can exist in theory? The question is not idle for there is an important puzzle: The type of agreements 
described in Part 2 above are subject to continuing political oversight and revision. They are unilaterally 
severable. In these ways they are non-binding. How can they at the same time generate rules and norms 
that guide regulators and commercial actors (affording, for instance the assurance of stability of the 
regulatory environment necessary to invest), and do this without in the end delegating authority to 
unaccountable bodies? To find a solution it is helpful to briefly develop a further implication of 
uncertainty in reshaping the circumstances of commercial exchange under globalization. 
Uncertainty figured in the earlier discussion of the increasing centrality and changing role of 
regulation and trade in two ways: as a cause of the reorganization of production—from vertically 
integrated to disintegrated, and from traditional to just-in-time production—and as a cause of increasing 
regulatory emphasis on ex post incident reporting of latent hazards that escaped ex ante review. A third, 
general effect of uncertainty is to transform contracting relations between innovative firms. Under 
relatively stable conditions, contracts between sophisticated parties are exchanges of highly detailed 
promises (and the penalties in case of breach). As the economy becomes more innovative and firms 
increasingly operate at the edge of established solutions, neither party can say exactly what is feasible. 
The nature of collaboration changes from a precise division of labor to a joint exploration of possibilities. 
In these cases, no particular outcome of the collaboration can be specified in advance; indeed, at the 
                                                     
32 See, e.g., Wijkström and McDaniels (2013) and Mavroidis (2016) for discussion of the SPS and TBT agreements. 
33 Participation in these groups spans a broad cross-section of the membership. The EU participates in all four groups. The 
US is part of one (e-commerce). China was a sponsor of three of the four groups – it decided not to join the group on e-
commerce. India as well as many African countries decided not to be part of any of the groups. Independent of whether a 
WTO member is a sponsor/supporter of a group, deliberations of the groups are open to all. China, for example, 
reportedly is an active participant in the discussions on e-commerce (interview with WTO official, October 4, 2018). 
34 See https://www.ft.com/content/3a8b7458-1fe5-11e9-b2f7-97e4dbd3580d.  
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farthest frontier of practical knowledge collaboration can end in failure to produce any useful outcome 
at all. Only if such collaborations produce marketable results do purchase orders (in the case of 
components entering supply chains) obligate the supplier to produce and the buyer to pay for specified 
quantities of the good at a certain date and price.  
Under these circumstances the nature of contract itself changes. Instead of defining precisely each 
party’s obligations, the contract establishes broad goals and a regime for evaluating achievement of 
them: regular, joint reviews of progress towards interim targets or milestones, as well as procedures for 
evaluating results and resolving disagreements in interpretation. The information exchanged under such 
contracts allows each party to evaluate the capacities and good faith of the other, and in so doing the 
prospects of both the particular project and joint efforts generally. As collaboration progresses, each 
party comes to rely increasingly on the capacities of the other, deterring opportunistic defection even in 
the absence of an explicit commitment to purchase anything in advance. Put another way, the formal 
requirements of the contract—the obligations of regular review and deliberate consideration of the 
interim results—create the conditions in which informal norms and self-interested calculations bind the 
parties to continue promising collaboration in good faith (Gilson, Sabel and Scott, 2009). 
Regulatory cooperation of the kind between the US and Canada in food safety and the US and the 
EU in civil aviation are instances of regulator-to-regulator contracts of the same novel type. In these 
cases, the exploration of the possibility of regulatory equivalence entails no obligation to find it; and 
once equivalence has been established, it must be re-established by periodic review. This disciplined 
reciprocal scrutiny leads to protocols for reciprocal review of procedures and—in the more mature case 
of civil aviation—governance institutions whose jurisdiction ranges from local dispute resolution to 
joint formulation of new rules. These protocols and governance institutions give each party warranted 
confidence in the robustness and adaptability of the other, increasing the breadth and depth of their 
shared understandings and making it less and less likely that either will exercise the continuing right to 
unilaterally end cooperation. Long-term mutual reliance is thus the outcome of continuing mutual 
review, not of an initial commitment to long-term collaboration or hard rules on processes or policies. 
As far as we can tell these agreements are subject to at least the same scrutiny as normal administrative 
rule making. Indeed, because they are examined in the mirror of the partner’s ongoing reviews, they are 
if anything scrutinized more carefully. In short, OPAs will always be under review. Because the rules 
are never fixed and final, or delegated for interpretive purposes to an autonomous, international entity, 
they are subject to ongoing sovereign and democratic control. But this same process of joint articulation 
of norms binds the parties by making them reliant on each other, and on rules that fit their changing 
circumstances, in accord with their values, because they make them together.  
4.1. How the WTO can make OPAs truly open and OPAs can open the WTO 
If OPAs flourish, we have argued, they can play a vital role in helping the WTO members articulate the 
norms and procedures to address the increasingly important question of regulatory diversity in ways that 
respect their sovereignty without relying on the paralyzing constitutional convention of the consensus 
of the members. But for OPAs to flourish they must be truly open—accessible to countries who may 
lack the resources and expertise to meet regulatory requirements established by OPA members or to 
defend their interests in disagreements over what regulatory arrangements count as equivalent. The 
WTO can provide valuable assistance in the form of technical support and facilitation of dispute 
resolution. In doing so it can in both cases build on the substantial foundations recently created by the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). 
The TFA, concluded in 2013, is the first multilateral agreement negotiated under WTO auspices. It 
comprises a set of agreed good practices in the area of trade facilitation. A central feature of the TFA is 
to help individual members adopt the good practices. It incorporates innovative measures for providing 
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technical support that could be adapted to the related task of helping members join OPAs.35 Under the 
TFA developing and least-developed countries experiencing difficulties meeting implementation 
deadlines notify the Committee on Trade Facilitation—the secretariat established to administer the 
agreement—and prepare a self-evaluation of the causes and remedies of the problems. The Committee 
then appoints an Expert Group with 5 highly qualified members; the Group reviews the self-assessment 
of incapacity and accepts or amends its findings; and the Committee upon final review approves a plan 
of technical support. Just such a procedure could be used to determine whether and in what form the 
WTO should provide technical support to members struggling to join particular OPAs. Analytically the 
TFA has an important affinity with the OPA: Membership in both is open to all WTO members, but on 
condition that candidates demonstrate the equivalence of their regulatory measures and procedures in a 
particular domain with those of the current regime.36 
Because if this affinity the expert groups of created under the TFA could serve as a template or 
building block for creating a dispute resolution mechanism to address differences between an OPAs as 
a body and a candidate member as to whether the latter’s standards and institutions in the relevant 
domain meet the equivalence test or on the path to meeting it. Such judgements necessarily fuse 
normative and technical criteria. Review of decisions by an expert group would help distinguish the 
most nearly technical aspects of the difficulties and suggest concrete measures to address them. At a 
minimum such review, and the responses it prompts, would help clarify the reasons for persistent 
objections and implicitly—in time, perhaps explicitly—set standards for the depth and extent of reason 
giving expected as justification of such decisions. This type of review, together with the joint, “internal” 
review of requests for membership that would presumably be undertaken as a matter of course by the 
existing parties to an OPA would ensure that the agreements are as open as they claim to be. 
Cumulatively the decisions of such expert bodies would create a kind of meta-standard establishing tests 
to determine whether the breadth and depth of the review of a candidate’s formal procedures and 
institutional practices is sufficiently searching and attentive to the possibility that divergent means can 
achieve shared ends to count as legitimate.37 
Expert groups on the model of the TFA could, in addition to dispute resolution, play an important, 
active role in ensuring that OPAs fulfill their promise of opening the WTO to emergent, potentially 
consensual regulatory norms and novel procedures. Expert groups reviewing disputes in different OPAs 
covering the same general domain—clubs with different standards and members—would be in an 
excellent position to identity possible commonalities in their approaches or suggest measures to bridge 
differences. At the least, the circulation of these expert groups would encourage the more general 
circulation of ideas among overlapping OPAs and at best it would help crystallize consensus when views 
and practices do begin to converge. The regular operation of the WTO would thus enable groups of 
parties to trade on terms that reflect their distinctive values while achieving consensus when possible 
through this exploration of difference. 
5. Conclusion 
Differences in regulation across jurisdictions for tangible and intangible products may impede trade by 
generating redundant transactions costs or segmenting markets (OECD, 2017). Regulation is now a 
prominent feature of trade policy and increasingly is being considered in the design of PTAs (Mumford, 
                                                     
35 See Hoekman (2016) for an in-depth discussion and assessment of the TFA. 
36 The TFA differs from the OPA in that membership in the former is ultimately obligatory, even if on a schedule that 
respects the candidates’ capacities and idiosyncrasies; and sub groups of members may not form an alternative trade 
facilitation regime. 
37 ISEAL is a meta-standard setter for organizations that define sustainability standards and establish procedures for 
certifying compliance with them; the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) plays a similar role for private organizations 
developing certification programs for food safety management systems. See ISEAL (2014) and GFSI (nd, version 7.2). 
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2018). Prominent examples are the CPTPP, recent EU agreements with Canada and Japan and the failed 
negotiations on a transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the EU and the US. Until 
recently WTO members have been unable to engage in deliberations to extend WTO disciplines to cover 
regulatory policy areas that are not or incompletely covered by existing agreements. One reason for this 
are WTO working practices – notably consensus and special and differential treatment for developing 
countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) – that have impeded the pursuit of cooperation among groups of 
WTO members to address issues of common concern.  
This constraint was relaxed at the 2017 Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, which saw the 
launch of plurilateral discussions on both old and new subjects, potentially opening the door to OPAs. 
Four “joint initiatives” were launched in Buenos Aires, one of which (on e-commerce and cross-border 
data flows) was transformed into a plurilateral negotiation group in early 2019. Insofar as these 
initiatives result in OPAs among groups of WTO members they offer the prospect of reducing regulatory 
compliance costs for firms operating internationally while enhancing the ability of regulatory agencies 
to attain societal objectives more efficiently. Providing a forum where countries can consider 
cooperation in a specific area of regulation is valuable. Having a (WTO) standard form for new, domain-
specific regulatory cooperation agreements (OPAs) can substantially cut transaction costs of cooperation 
for countries while offering a credible prospect of gradual multilateralization. This is not a strong feature 
of the forms of regulatory cooperation observed in PTAs (which are generally closed) or those pursued, 
often bilaterally, on a sectoral basis, some of which we have discussed in this paper.  
Clearly not all types of regulatory cooperation are appropriate for consideration in OPAs under WTO 
auspices. For example, OPAs are less suitable to address the negative spillover effects of explicitly 
discriminatory policies that give rise to terms of trade effects, as free rider concerns will arise that may 
preclude small group cooperation. Many regulatory policy areas that give rise to trade costs do lend 
themselves to OPAs, however, as free riding concerns either do not arise or can be addressed. The scope 
for OPAs may be larger than is perceived by economic policymakers.38  
It is an open question whether a regulatory OPA—or an undertaking to explore the possibilities of 
agreement—concluded outside the WTO counts more credibly (to a skeptical civil society) as a new, 
stand-alone form of cooperation than the same agreement concluded inside the WTO. In our view formal 
recognition of OPAs as a new kind of arrangement, entailing no obligation to agree in the end to 
cooperate and the severability of eventual agreements offers an avenue for regenerating the WTO by 
assisting countries to reduce the trade costs of regulatory differences while improving regulatory 
outcomes. Not pursuing this route would be to miss an opportunity to revitalize the WTO. Perhaps more 
important is the scope that OPAs offer to participants and stakeholders to multilateralize sectoral 
regulatory cooperation initiatives of the type discussed above that are proliferating outside the ambit of 
trade agreements, and to some extent are reflected in recent PTAs. Such arrangements tend to be closed 
or lack explicit mechanisms to consider, let alone encourage, participation by additional countries. OPAs 
can help support the gradual multilateralization of international regulatory cooperation initiatives that 
address matters that are of potential interest to many countries, by helping to enhance transparency, 
encourage mutual review, support learning, and provide a platform to strengthen regulatory capacity in 
countries where needed to be able to participate in a given OPA.  
                                                     
38 Indeed, even a conflictual policy area such as subsidies arguably lends itself at least to some extent to an OPA. For 
example, the type of review and reasoning that is part of any OPA is needed in the subsidies context given that their 
potential salience in addressing market failures and achieving social objectives makes it much harder to write down hard 
rules. The design of any rules and their implementation must be informed by an understanding of the underlying goals (as 
elucidated by the government using them), and neutral assessments of their effects.  
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